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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER CONGRESS MAY REGULATE NEW
UNION ROOFING AND DRYWALL'S DISPOSAL
OF A HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE UNDER
THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE, WHEN NEW UNION ROOFING AND
DRYWALL HAS ALWAYS PERFORMED ITS
BUSINESS LOCALLY.
II. WHETHER BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES OF NEW UNION MAY SEEK
SITE REMEDIATION COSTS UNDER
SECTION 7002 OF RCRA, WHEN RCRA
DOES NOT EXPRESSLY CREATE A PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RESTITUTION.
III. WHETHER THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AND BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES OF NEW UNION CAN
SEEK COST RECOVERY FROM NEW UNION
ROOFING AND DRYWALL UNDER CERCLA
107, WHEN THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE
DISPOSED OF WAS ACTUALLY A MIXTURE,
AND THE MIXTURE RULE WAS VACATED BY
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
COURT.
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OPINION BELOW
The unreported opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union is set out in the tran-
script of the record.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction need not be asserted as compliance with
Supreme Court Rule 24.1 (e) is waived under B (3) of the Offi-
cial Rules for the 1996 Eighth Annual National Environmen-
tal Law Moot Court Competition.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Statutes and regulations relevant to the determination of
the present case are listed in the Table of Authorities.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union, decided April 23,
1995. Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New Union
appeals the decision of the District Court with respect to the
liability of New Union Roofing and Drywall for site remedia-
tion costs under Section 7002 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976). The
United States Environmental Protection Agency participates
as amicus on this issue. Brownfields Redevelopment Associ-
ates of New Union and United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency also appeal the lower court judgment regarding
the liability of New Union Roofing and Drywall for cost recov-
ery under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental
1996] 979
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Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1980). The standard of review for all ques-
tions raised in this appeal is de novo.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
New Union Roofing and Drywall (NURD) is a roofing
business in Cathertown, New Union. (R. 2).1 It was owned
by Andrew Peterson and then incorporated in 1981. From
1981 to 1983 NURD operated its roofing business in the
Moll's Garden residential neighborhood. In 1984, NURD
moved to a site in Cathertown's industrial area. (R. 3). Dur-
ing NURD's operations at its Moll's Gardens site, NURD pre-
pared batches of "roof acid," a chemical applied to remove old
roof shingles. (R. 3). NURD purchased the roof acid in a pow-
der form, and then mixed it with water. (R. 3). As mixed
with water, roof acid is a listed hazardous waste under
RCRA, which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
implements in New Union. (R. 3). Roof acid was listed as a
RCRA hazardous waste on December 31, 1980.
The roof acid used by NURD was manufactured in Vir-
ginia and transported through interstate commerce to a hard-
ware store in Cathertown. (R. 5). Similarly, NURD's truck
was manufactured in Michigan and transported through in-
terstate commerce to a dealership in Cathertown. (R. 5). On
20 to 30 occasions from 1981 to 1983, NURD disposed of ex-
cess roof acid in a compost pit behind its building after mix-
ing it with leftover fruit juice. (R. 3). Other materials, such
as leaves, grass clippings, and food scraps, were tossed into
the compost pit as well. (R. 3). The compost pit is the only
source of contamination on NURD's property. (R. 4).
In 1990 the Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of
New Union (BRANU) purchased the site from NURD. (R. 3).
BRANU, owned by Elizabeth Kates, purchased industrial
sites in Cathertown. (R. 3). The company would perform any
necessary environmental remediation, and then resell the
sites at a profit. (R. 3). Since BRANU was incorporated in
1. Cites to (R.) refer to pages of the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/33
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1984, it has purchased three sites: a former dry cleaner,
which was remediated and resold as a photo supply shop; a
former gas station, currently up for sale; and the former
NURD site. (R. 3). The former NURD site is now used for
residential purposes. (R. 3). The parties have stipulated that
at the time BRANU purchased NURD's site BRANU did not
know, nor did it have reason to know, that NURD had dis-
posed of any hazardous substance in the site. (R. 4).
After the hazardous waste disposal was discovered and
reported, EPA performed soil and groundwater tests. (R. 4).
EPA spent $100,000 for its sampling and laboratory analysis.
In 1990 the EPA concluded that "[a] key location on the site
has soil that is sufficiently contaminated with roof acid to
constitute a danger should the site be used as residential
property or other land use in which soil contact by individu-
als is likely." (R. 4). Because EPA knew that BRANU owned
the site and that BRANU was a land redevelopment com-
pany, EPA decided that federal action to remediate the soil
was not necessary at that time. (R. 4).
BRANU seeks to recover its remediation expenses from
NURD pursuant to CERCLA and RCRA § 7002. (R. 4). EPA
commenced this action under CERCLA to recover its
$100,000 in sampling and analysis costs. (R. 4). The lower
court concluded that NURD was not liable to BRANU under
RCRA § 7002 because RCRA did not provide for a private
cause of action. (R. 6). However, the court concluded that
RCRA was validly enacted by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. (R. 6). Furthermore, neither BRANU nor the EPA
could recover under CERCLA because the roof acid was not a
listed hazardous waste when mixed with the fruit juice. (R.
8).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact RCRA § 7002 because hazardous waste disposal sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. Because the nexus be-
tween commercial activity and waste disposal is well
documented in congressional findings and legislative history,
9811996]
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Congress may rationally conclude that waste disposal affects
interstate commerce. Furthermore, NURD's hazardous
waste disposal sufficiently affected commerce to justify re-
quiring NURD's compliance with RCRA. NURD's hazardous
waste may adversely affect the environment in neighboring
states. In addition, NURD purchased goods and services
from out of state suppliers, and contaminated a site which
could be resold to out of state individuals seeking to relocate
to New Union.
BRANU cannot seek remedial costs from NURD because
RCRA § 7002 does not authorize a private cause of action for
restitution. Courts may not imply a private cause of action
unless it is clear that Congress intended to create such a
right. No such implication is justified in the instant case be-
cause Congress specified in detail all remedies it intended to
provide. Furthermore, the citizens' suits provision of RCRA
only provides for claims by parties acting as private attorneys
general, not for those pursuing a private remedy. Thus, it
would be improper for this court to imply additional
remedies.
The EPA can collect its response action costs from NURD
because the roof acid mixture was a hazardous waste under
CERCLA § 107. EPA promulgated a mixture rule defining
hazardous waste to include "a mixture of solid waste and one
or more hazardous wastes listed." 40 C.F.R. 261.3 (1992). By
this definition, the roof acid disposed of by NURD, even when
mixed with the fruit juice, is a hazardous substance. The
mixture rule was in effect at the time of the disposal, and
thus is applicable to the instant case. The vacatur of the rule
does not mean that the rule was void ab initio. In the alter-
native, the EPA has the authority to apply its reissued mix-
ture rule retroactively.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/33
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ARGUMENT
I. CONGRESS HAS AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO REQUIRE NURD
COMPLIANCE WITH RCRA § 7002.
Applying RCRA § 7002 to NURD does not exceed Con-
gressional authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the
authority to regulate commerce among the several states.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The power of Congress over inter-
state commerce extends to intrastate activities which so af-
fect interstate commerce as to make regulation appropriate.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). Because
the nexus between commercial activity and the generation of
solid waste is well documented, Congress may rationally con-
clude that waste disposal affects interstate commerce.
United States v. Rogers, 685 F.Supp. 201, 202 (D. Minn.
1987). Congressional findings have established hazardous
waste disposal as a matter of national concern necessitating
federal action. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, § 1002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1976). Furthermore,
NURD's hazardous waste disposal sufficiently affected inter-
state commerce to justify requiring NURD to comply with
RCRA.
A. Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact RCRA § 7002 because waste disposal affects
commerce and is a national concern.
Congress may regulate the disposal of hazardous waste
pursuant to its commerce clause powers because waste dispo-
sal, and hazardous waste in particular, is "a matter national
in scope." RCRA §1002(a)(4). Even before the enactment of
RCRA, Congress demonstrated a growing federal interest in
the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes by adopting the
Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, the Resource Recovery Act
of 1970, superseded by RCRA, the Toxic Substances Control
Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.
Extensive congressional findings and legislative history
set forth the interstate affects of hazardous waste disposal
9831996]
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and the need for federal regulation. In determining the con-
stitutionality of congressional action under the Commerce
Clause, the courts may consider legislative findings and com-
mittee reports. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1631
(1995). The legislative history found that "although the dis-
posal of discarded materials has traditionally been consid-
ered a local problem, it is in fact one of broader scope." H.R.
Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1976). Con-
gressional findings further state that "the problems of waste
disposal... have become a matter national in scope and in
concern and necessitate Federal action through financial and
technical assistance and leadership. " 42 U.S.C.
§6901(a)(4).
A court must defer to a congressional finding that a regu-
lated activity affects interstate commerce if there is any ra-
tional basis for such a finding. Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). The Committee of Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce found that, without a regulatory
framework, hazardous wastes would continue to be disposed
of in a manner resulting in "substantial and sometimes irre-
versible pollution of the environment." H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at
3. The Committee expressed concern over the effects of haz-
ardous waste disposal on human health and the environ-
ment, noting that much of the hazardous waste disposed of is
in interstate commerce. Id. It found that this legislation is
necessary for other environmental laws to be effective, since
existing methods of waste disposal often result in air pollu-
tion, water pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off.
Id. at 4.
The legislature also found a need for a more wide-rang-
ing dissemination of information. Technical and institutional
barriers faced by municipalities are often insurmountable
without federal assistance. Id. at 10. Moreover, the aggrega-
tion of so many independent units of local governments cre-
ates institutional and legal barriers to effectively deal with
waste disposal problems. This aggregation complicates finan-
cial arrangements, particularly involving financing for facili-
ties or equipment. Additionally, most local governments
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/33
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have no experts on recovery technology or conservation sys-
tems. Id.
In United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New Eng-
land, 496 F.Supp. 1127 (D.Conn. 1980), the court stated that
these congressional findings "eliminate any doubt that by
1976 Congress had deemed the disposal of hazardous wastes
an important federal concern, which was related to other
types of pollution regulated by federal law, and which re-
quired uniform federal standards." Id. at 1138. Similarly, a
district court found that, "RCRA easily passes constitutional
muster as an exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause." United States v. Rogers, 685 F.Supp. 201, 202
(D. Minn. 1987). See also United States v. ILCO, 48 B.R.
1016, 1021 (D. Ala. 1985) ("Clearly RCRA and CERCLA are
rooted in the Commerce Clause.") Thus the legislative his-
tory and congressional findings establish a sufficiently strong
federal interest in preventing pollution caused by hazardous
wastes to justify federal legislation.
The complex regulatory program established by RCRA
can survive a commerce clause challenge without showing
that every facet of the program is independently and directly
related to a valid congressional goal. See Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. 314, 328 (1981). "It is enough that the challenged
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and
that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satis-
fies this test." Id. Section 7002 is an integral part of RCRA's
regulatory program. It authorizes citizen suits in instances
where disposal of hazardous waste has created an imminent
or substantial danger. Such suits are important to RCRA's
regulatory framework because they encourage abatement
and remediation of hazardous waste sites.
B. NURD's activities have a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce to require compliance with RCRA § 7002.
NURD's activities sufficiently affect interstate commerce
to justify requiring compliance with RCRA § 7002. Congress
may regulate an intrastate activity that has a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce, irrespective of whether such ef-
9851996]
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fect is direct or indirect. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
125 (1942). The indirect effects of NURD's and BRANU's ac-
tivities on interstate commerce are sufficient to allow
NURD's activities to be regulated under the Commerce
Clause. Furthermore, even if NURD's actual effect on inter-
state commerce is slight, the court must not only consider
NURD's actions, but also the aggregate effect on interstate
commerce of all those similarly situated to NURD.
1. Congress may regulate an intrastate activity that
has an indirect effect on interstate commerce.
The characterization of an activity as "local" or intrastate
does not resolve the question of whether Congress may regu-
late it under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause
extends to intrastate activities which so affect interstate com-
merce that congressional regulation is appropriate as a
means of attaining a legitimate end, and effectively regulat-
ing interstate commerce. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,
452 U.S. 264 (1981). Congress may regulate an intrastate ac-
tivity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
"irrespective of whether such effect is what might... have
been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" Wickard 317 U.S. at
128. "There is no question of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause to include otherwise ostensibly local activi-
ties within the reach of federal economic regulation, when
such activities sufficiently implicate interstate commerce."
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1975).
In United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368 (10th
Cir. 1979), the court held that pollution of a stream suffi-
ciently affected commerce to be covered by the Clean Water
Act. The stream was located entirely in one county, was not
navigable, and was not used to transport goods or materials.
Respondents argued that the stream did not provide a signifi-
cant link in the chain of commerce. However, the court held
that "the stipulation of facts indicates at least some inter-
state impact from this stream, and that is all that is neces-
sary under the Act." Id. at 374. The fact that the stream
supported trout and beaver, and that its water was used for
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/33
MEASURING BRIEF
agricultural irrigation, provided a sufficient link to interstate
commerce.
The parties have stipulated that both BRANU and
NURD have indirect effects on commerce. (R.5). First,
NURD and BRANU purchase goods and services from out-of-
state suppliers. Second, the property polluted by NURD, and
remediated by BRANU, may be purchased by an out-of-state
individual. Lastly, NURD's pollution may have adverse envi-
ronmental consequences on wildlife or groundwater which
may move outside the state. Thus, the fact that NURD oper-
ated locally is not dispositive. "Activities conducted within
State lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the
Commerce Clause." United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative
Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939).
a. NURD and BRANU purchased goods through
interstate commerce.
NURD's and BRANU's activities affect interstate com-
merce because they affect the demand and supply of goods
passing through interstate commerce. See United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (upholding
Congress's power to regulate the marketing of milk produced
and sold intrastate but in competition with milk marketed in-
terstate). NURD purchased roof acid manufactured in Vir-
ginia and transported through interstate commerce to a store
in Cathertown. (R.5). Furthermore, NURD's truck was man-
ufactured in Michigan, and transported through interstate
commerce to a dealership in Cathertown. (R.5). All supplies
used by NURD have national markets, with prices set com-
petitively from many manufacturers. Moreover, payments to
BRANU's and NURD's employees enable those employees to
purchase goods from out of state. Purchases from suppliers
provide profits to both the suppliers and the manufacturers
which enable them to pay their own employees who, in turn
purchase goods in interstate commerce.
Courts have found such affects on interstate commerce
sufficient to allow regulation under the Commerce Clause.
See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). In Daniel the
Supreme Court held that a snack bar in a private club was a
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covered "public accommodation" under the Civil Rights Act.
Id. at 302. The snack bar served food to interstate travelers
and purchased food which had moved in interstate commerce.
The Court noted that certain ingredients going into the bread
and soft drinks were produced and processed in other states.
Likewise NURD's roof acid, the hazardous waste which pol-
luted the site, was purchased out of state. (R.5).
b. the site may be purchased by a person from
out of state.
BRANU remediates contaminated land for resale to pur-
chasers who may not be residents of New Union. NURD's
site has in fact been purchased for residential purposes.
(R.4).2 The Supreme Court has noted that the population
"has become increasingly mobile, with millions of peo-
ple... traveling from state to state." Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241,252 (1964). NURD's contamination
of a site potentially marketable to out of state residents limits
their ability to relocate in Cathertown. NURD's activities
"sufficiently contaminated [the site] with roof acid to consti-
tute a danger should the site be used as residential property."
(R.4). Costs to remediate the site may have substantially in-
creased the selling price of the land.
Activities which interfere with the allocation of housing
resources may be regulated by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. See Morgan v. HUD, 985 F.2d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir.
1993). In Morgan an appellate court struck down a discrimi-
natory housing statute. The court reasoned that housing dis-
crimination interferes with the efficient allocation of housing
resources, and could thus hinder interstate relocation. Con-
gress therefore could reasonably seek to remove such impedi-
ments by relying on its commerce power. See also Seniors
Civil Liberties Union Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.
1992) (the housing market affects interstate commerce). "If it
is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter
how local the operation which applies the squeeze." United
2. The facts do not state whether the purchasers of the site were residents
of Cathertown or from out of state.
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States v. Woman's Sportswear Mfg Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949). Thus, NURD's activities affect interstate commerce
because the contaminated a site may reasonably affect the
housing market.
c. NURD's hazardous waste disposal may
adversely affect the environment in
neighboring states.
Congress may regulate NURD's activities under the
Commerce Clause because hazardous waste disposal has ad-
verse environmental affects in neighboring states. Pollution,
especially hazardous wastes, invades natural ecosystems and
groundwater systems which do not respect state boundaries.
Harm to one ecosystem may have substantial consequences
to other ecosystems as a result of the dynamic nature of living
organisms. Poisons pass through the food chain in animals
traveling among several states. RCRA's legislative history
recognized this fact by citing an incident where children sus-
tained serious alkyl mercury poisoning after eating contami-
nated pork. H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 23. This example
illustrates the protracted effects of hazardous wastes.
Further, hazardous waste disposal affecting one state's
water supply may contaminate the water supply of neighbor-
ing states. Groundwater travels underground, often below
several states. The transboundary nature of groundwater
pollution necessitates national pollution prevention meas-
ures. The law must respect the complexities and interrela-
tionships of the natural world. The federal government must
be able to regulate threats to the environment on a national
scale in order to properly protect and manage the nation's
natural resources as a whole. Even small amounts of hazard-
ous waste disposed of locally, such as NURD's disposal of roof
acid, may contaminate groundwater or enter the food chain,
poisoning plants and animals in other regions.
Case law has upheld federal regulation in such in-
stances. Earth Science, 599 F.2d at 374, found that effects on
trout and beaver, and on stream flow, had a sufficient effect
on interstate commerce to apply to Clean Water Act to a
stream located entirely in one county. Similarly, the court in
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Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 999 F.2d 256
(7th Cir. 1993), found that a body of water affects interstate
commerce if its degradation or destruction would have an ef-
fect upon migratory birds. NURD's disposal of roof acid
threatens wildlife living in or around the contaminated area.
These effects sufficiently relate to interstate commerce to per-
mit federal regulation thereof.
2. If all those similarly situated to NURD disposed of
their hazardous waste in a like manner, the
aggregate effects of the pollution would
significantly affect interstate commerce.
Assuming arguendo that NURD's singular disposal of
roof acid does not significantly effect interstate commerce, the
aggregate effect of hazardous waste disposal from all those
similarly situated to NURD would significantly effect com-
merce. Congress may regulate acts which are nationally sig-
nificant in their aggregate effect. The triviality of an
individual act's impact is irrelevant so long as the class of
such acts may reasonably have substantial national conse-
quences. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The
Supreme Court established this principle in Wickard by hold-
ing that Congress could control a farmer's production of
wheat for home consumption. Id. at 127. The Court reasoned
that the cumulative effects of home consumption of wheat by
many farmers may alter the supply and demand relationship
of the interstate market. "That the appellee's own contribu-
tion to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S.
601 (1939), the Court expressly stated that the operation of
the Commerce Clause does not depend on any particular vol-
ume of commerce affected. The company at issue was a small
clothing manufacturer, employing from 60 to 200 employees.
The Court held that the small volume of commerce affected
was without significance. "Commerce may be affected in the
same manner and to the same extent in proportion to its vol-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/33
MEASURING BRIEF
ume, whether it be great or small." Id. at 607. See also Perez
v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("where the class of activi-
ties is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal
power, the courts have no right to excise, as trivial, individual
instances of the class."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192
(1968) ("The contention that in commerce clause cases the
courts have the power to excise, as trivial, individual in-
stances falling within a rationally defined class of activities,
has been entirely put to rest.").
Thus, under the Commerce Clause, Congress can reach
any individual activity, no matter how insignificant if, when
combined with other similar activities, it exerts a "substan-
tial economic effect on interstate commerce." Wickard, 317
U.S. at 100. Congressional findings established that waste
disposal is a national problem, significantly threatening the
nation's health and environment. NURD's disposal of haz-
ardous waste contaminated the soil, which may affect wild-
life, groundwater, and public health. If all those similarly
situated to NURD disposed of their hazardous waste in a like
manner, serious public health and environmental conse-
quences would result.
C. This case is distinguishable from Lopez because it
involves an economic activity and because there are
legislative findings establishing the effects on
interstate commerce.
Applying RCRA § 7002 to these facts does not exceed
Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause
in light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court
struck down a federal statute on the grounds that it violated
the Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional because (1) it
was a criminal statute that did not involve commerce or any
sort of economic activity, (2) the statute contained no jurisdic-
tional element to ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
possession of a firearm had any concrete tie to interstate com-
merce, and (3) gun possession is traditionally a subject of
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state control. The instant case is distinguishable on all three
grounds.
1. NURD's and BRANU's activities are economic in
nature.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court found that the Gun Act ex-
ceeded Congress's ability to regulate commerce because gun
possession in a school zone does not involve an economic ac-
tivity. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. However, NURD's roofing
and drywall business clearly involves economic activity.
NURD is a profit oriented entity, engaging in commercial ac-
tivity by selling its services and purchasing products from
other suppliers. Likewise, BRANU is an economic enterprise
which purchases land with the intention of reselling it at a
profit.
In discussing the requirement that a regulation concern
an economic activity, the Lopez Court cited Wickard v. Fil-
burn. Id. at 1624. In Wickard, the Court upheld a penalty
against a farmer for harvesting more wheat then he was al-
lotted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Wickard, 317
U.S. at 127. This extra wheat was grown entirely for the
farmer's personal consumption. The Lopez Court stated that
such an activity was sufficiently economic in nature because
"a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and mar-
ket conditions." Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1624 (quoting Wickard,
317 U.S. at 128). Thus, even apparently tenuous economic
activities, such as growing wheat for personal consumption,
qualify as an economic activity under the Lopez reasoning.
2. Sufficient jurisdictional elements exist to regulate
NURD under the Commerce Clause.
The Lopez court struck down the Gun Act because it con-
tained no jurisdictional element which would ensure that the
firearm possession in question affected interstate commerce.
In discussing this aspect, the Court stated that "as part of our
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and
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indeed even congressional committee findings." Lopez, 115
S.Ct. at 1631. The Court found that neither the Gun Act nor
its legislative history contained express congressional find-
ings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun
possession in a public school. Id. at 1632.
However in the instant case, lengthy congressional find-
ings and 112 pages of legislative history explicitly outline the
effects of waste disposal on interstate commerce. See discus-
sion supra I.A. RCRA was a product of several years of hear-
ings and markups before various subcommittees, including
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The
legislative history reveals a strong need for national legisla-
tion in the area of waste disposal because "waste itself is in
interstate and intermunicipal commerce. . ." and "hazardous
waste is more likely to be the subject of interstate transporta-
tion than is non-hazardous industrial or municipal waste."
H.R. No. 1491 at 10. Congress outlined the national health
concerns and environmental threats waste disposal poses, as
well as the institutional barriers to effective regional or state-
wide planning for discarded materials management. Id. at
11.
3. Hazardous waste disposal is not an appropriate
area for state control.
The Lopez Court struck down the gun possession statute
because it intruded into an area of traditional state concern,
namely criminal law. The Lopez Court identified education,
family law, and criminal law as areas of traditional state reg-
ulation, but made no mention of environmental or land use
law. In fact, the Supreme Court has previously recognized
that there is a strong federal interest in controlling certain
types of pollution and in protecting the environment. See Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
In Virginia Surface Mining appellees contended that reg-
ulating surface mining exceeded Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause because land use regulation was an in-
herent police power of the state. The Court rejected this ar-
gument, finding that the mining activity affected commerce
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and public welfare by destroying and diminishing the utility
of land for commercial, industrial, agricultural, and forestry
purposes. Inadequacies in existing state laws and the need
for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal
regulation appropriate. Id. at 280. Furthermore, uniform
standards were essential to ensure fair competition in inter-
state commerce among sellers of coal produced in different
states.
In the instant case, Congress has determined that waste
disposal has created a problem "national in scope," which
poses a national threat to public health and the environment.
Legislative history supports the finding that the states were
unable to appropriately regulate waste disposal because of
economic and institutional barriers. Furthermore, because
waste itself is in interstate commerce, some states have en-
acted protectionist measures to prohibit the importation of
foreign waste.
D. Section 7002's substantive standards come from federal
common law which does not require a showing of
interstate effects.
Interstate effects need not be alleged in order to apply
RCRA § 7002 to NURD. The federal common law of nuisance
governs an action brought under the imminent hazard provi-
sion of RCRA. See U.S. v. Solvents Recovery Service of New
England, 496 F.Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980). In Solvents Re-
covery, the United States instituted an action for injunctive
relief to abate and remedy unlawful groundwater pollution.
Id. at 498. Defendants argued that the action was deficient
because it failed to allege that the seepage of chemicals into
underground wells had interstate effects. The court found
that § 7003 merely granted jurisdiction; it did not establish
standards for determining the lawfulness of the conduct of
those sued by the United States.3 Those standards must be
3. Although Solvents Recovery involved § 7003 of RCRA, the holding
should be equally applicable to § 7002 because of the close similarity in lan-
guage. The differences between the statutes are not relevant to issues regard-
ing the Commerce Clause.
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found elsewhere in RCRA or in the regulations promulgated
pursuant to RCRA, or in the federal common law of nuisance.
Id. at 1134.
The Supreme Court gave life to this body of federal com-
mon law in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
The Court stated that "federal courts will be empowered to
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public
nuisance by water pollution." Id. at 107. See also United
States v. Valentine, 856 F.Supp. 627 (1994) (Courts may for-
mulate federal common law under RCRA § 7003 where neces-
sary to protect uniquely federal interests or where Congress
has given power to develop substantive law.). The basis for
this federal cause of action was the strong federal interest in
controlling certain types of pollution and protecting the envi-
ronment. The substantive principles which govern an action
for equitable relief under RCRA are found in the common
law.
Citing Milwaukee, the court in Solvents Recovery con-
cluded that there was an overriding federal interest in pre-
serving interstate waters. "When a pollution controversy
arises, it is immaterial whether there is a showing of extra-
territorial pollution effects. The issue is whether the dispute
is a matter of federal concern." Solvents Recovery, 496
F.Supp. at 1134. The court reasoned that "conditioning a
§ 7003 claim on the allegation of interstate effects would be
fundamentally inconsistent with the character of the pollu-
tion which is the target of the legislation and incompatible
with the nature and extent of the federal concern embodied in
RCRA." Id. at 1138. Accordingly, the court held that plain-
tiffs complaint was not deficient for failure to plead any ex-
traterritorial effects. Plaintiff stated a cause of action under
the federal common law of nuisance, even though the pollu-
tion was confined within the town limits.
Thus, as long a NURD's waste disposal created a nui-
sance under federal common law, interstate affects need not
be alleged. Such a nuisance claim is clearly made considering
the EPA's findings in their site report. The report concluded
that the soil around the site was sufficiently contaminated
with roof acid to constitute a danger should the site be used
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as residential property or for any other use in which soil con-
tact by individuals is likely. (R. 4).
II. BRANU CANNOT SEEK SITE REMEDIATION
COSTS FROM NURD BECAUSE RCRA § 7002
DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR RESTITUTION.
The federal district courts have no authority under
RCRA to grant BRANU remediation costs. Section 7002 does
not expressly create a private cause of action for restitution,
and there is no support for implying a private cause of action
for personal remedies thereunder.
A. Congress did not intend to create a private cause of
action for restitution under RCRA § 7002.
BRANU cannot file a claim for restitution under RCRA
§ 7002 because Congress limited the jurisdiction of federal
district courts in citizens' suits to injunctive relief. RCRA
§ 7002 does not expressly provide for restitution as a remedy,
and there is no apparent support for the proposition that
Congress intended to imply such a remedy.
1. The Supreme Court has firmly established that
federal courts are not to imply federal private
causes of action unless it is clear that
Congress intended to bestow such a right.
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court
outlined a "preferred approach for determining whether a pri-
vate right of action should be implied from a federal stat-
ute...." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 26 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). This approach in-
volved the consideration of four factors: (1) is the plaintiff
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted, (2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one, (3) is
it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy, and (4) is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law? The Supreme Court
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has since explained that the ultimate issue is whether Con-
gress intended to create a private right of action. See Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) ("The question is
not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Con-
gress intended to confer federal rights upon those
beneficiaries.").
The Sixth Circuit applied this doctrine to RCRA § 7002
and refused to imply a private cause of action for restitution.
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 315-316 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding the types of relief available limited to in-
junctive remedies). The Walls court held that under the Cort
line of cases it was correct to dismiss plaintiffs count for dam-
ages under RCRA § 7002 since the statute did not expressly
permit a private action for damages. Walls, 761 F.2d at 316;
see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that Congress did not
confer a federal right in restitution to private parties under
RCRA).
2. It would be improper for this court to imply
additional judicial remedies because Congress
specified those remedies it intended to avail to
citizens under RCRA § 7002.
This court cannot find an implied private cause of action
for restitution under RCRA § 7002 because Congress has spe-
cifically defined all remedies that are available to private citi-
zens. This court would violate established rules of statutory
interpretation if it were to assume that Congress intended to
imply additional judicial remedies. Middlesex County Sewer-
age Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453
U.S. 1, 14 (1981).
In Middlesex, the Supreme Court considered whether
Congress intended to create a private cause of action under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) where one
was not explicit. Id. at 10-11. The Court reaffirmed its hold-
ing in California v. Sierra Club, stating that the key to the
inquiry is legislative intent. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 14 (cit-
ing, among other authorities, California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. at 293).
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In interpreting the intent of Congress, the Middlesex
court considered all of the elaborate enforcement provisions
in the FWPCA. The Court concluded that because Congress
had chosen to provide the various causes of action in such
detail, the Court could not assume that Congress intended to
authorize by implication additional judicial remedies. Mid-
dlesex, 453 U.S. at 14. "It is an elemental canon of statutory
construction that where a statute expressly provides a partic-
ular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it." Id. at 14-15 (citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at
19).
In the instant case, Congress similarly provided for vari-
ous specific remedies and set out elaborate provisions pre-
scribing the manner and form in which authorized suits must
be occur. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972 (a-g) (delineating every as-
pect of citizens' suits authorized under RCRA, from notice re-
quirements to the types of relief authorized). In the absence
of any indicia to the contrary, this court must conclude that
Congress provided for precisely those remedies it desired to
create. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 15. Congress excluded restitu-
tion as an available private remedy when it specifically de-
fined those remedies that a private party may seek under
RCRA. Therefore, to hold that BRANU may seek restitution
under RCRA would be contrary to congressional intent.
3. The citizens' suits provision of RCRA only provides
for claims by parties acting as private attorneys
general, not those pursuing a private remedy.
Section 7002 confers on citizens a "limited right... to sue
to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. .. ."
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, H.R. No.
198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, 53 (1983) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612. Similar citizens'
suits provisions are viewed by the Supreme Court as supple-
mentary enforcement mechanisms to the Acts in which they
appear, not as a means of seeking private remedies. See Mid-
dlesex, 453 U.S. at 14 ("These citizen-suit provisions author-
ize private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce [their
respective] statutes."). The Fourth Circuit interpreted the
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citizens' suits provision of RCRA to grant the same authority.
The court held that Section 7002 authorizes only those suits
by private parties where the party is acting as a private attor-
ney general, rather than pursuing a private remedy. Lam-
phier, 714 F.2d at 337.
RCRA § 7002(a) specifically limits the jurisdiction of fed-
eral district courts to four remedies: (1) enforcement of
RCRA requirements that have been violated; (2) restraining
any past or present contributors; (3) ordering responsible per-
sons to take such action as necessary; or (4) ordering the Ad-
ministrator to perform any non-discretionary act or duty. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a). These remedies allow private parties to ad-
vocate matters in the public interest consistent with "the pri-
mary goal of this provision, namely the prompt abatement of
imminent and substantial endangerments." Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 at 5612. All of the above
remedies are injunctive in nature and do not provide a pri-
vate party any especial benefits.
In the instant case, BRANU is requesting personal recov-
ery for site remediation costs, a remedy not considered under
RCRA § 7002. Awarding BRANU substantive relief in the
form of site remediation costs would be contrary to the pur-
pose of RCRA's citizens' suits provision, which only allow pri-
vate parties to sue in the public interest as private attorneys
general. Lamphier, 714 F.2d at 337. In asking the court to
award money damages for remedial costs, BRANU is "re-
questing relief that is beyond the powers of the district court
to grant under the citizens-suit provision of RCRA." Ports-
mouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. BMI Apart-
ments Associates, 847 F.Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994). The
statute simply does not provide a private action for damages.
Therefore, BRANU should not be allowed to use RCRA
§ 7002 to seek personal financial gain.
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B. This court cannot follow the holding of the Ninth
Circuit in KFC Western because it is contrary to
both congressional intent and Supreme Court
precedent.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in KFC Western, Inc.
v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), is not binding in the
instant case and should not be followed. The two-to-one ma-
jority in KFC did not follow the intent of Congress, nor did
the court base its decision on controlling Supreme Court
precedent.
In KFC, the plaintiff sought to recover remediation costs
under RCRA § 7002. The district court granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss, holding that Section 7002 authorized
only injunctive or other equitable relief. Id. at 519-520. The
Ninth Circuit reversed concluding that district courts are au-
thorized to order that defendants take "such other action as
may be necessary." Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(2)). The majority relied on this statutory lan-
guage erroneously to imply a private cause of action for
restitution.
Interpreting this language to authorize restitution is con-
trary to the intent of the Legislature. Congress was referring
to injunctive relief when it authorized district courts "to order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary..."
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (emphasis added). The legislative his-
tory indicates that the phrase was intended to authorize both
short- and long-term injunctive relief needed to compel re-
sponsible parties to remediate imminent hazards. United
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting The
Eckhardt Report, H.R. Rep. No. 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1979)) (referring to § 7003 from which the language was
taken).
This language has also been precluded as a means of ob-
taining restitution even under equitable principles. In Com-
merce Holding Company, Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F.Supp. 441
(E.D. N.Y. 1990), the plaintiffs contended that they were not
seeking legal or compensatory damages under RCRA, "but
only equitable relief in the form of reimbursement for costs
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for remediation of the [s]ite." Id. at 445. The court held that
even maintaining the claim as equitable under this RCRA
language, the plaintiff would be the direct beneficiary of the
substantive relief. "Thus, regardless of how the request is de-
nominated, it does not comport with the statute's purpose of
allowing private parties to bring suit if 'genuinely acting as
private attorneys general rather than pursuing a private
remedy.'" Id. (quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983).
III. CERCLA AUTHORIZES THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
TO COLLECT RESPONSE ACTION COSTS
FROM NEW UNION ROOFING AND
DRYWALL.
NURD must reimburse the EPA for the costs incurred by
the agency in its response action to NURD's illegal disposal of
a mixture which constituted a hazardous substance. The Dis-
trict Court found NURD not liable, erroneously concluding
that the mixture rule had been voided ab initio by the D.C.
Circuit in Shell Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). However, the mixture rule was
still in effect when NURD disposed of the roof-acid mixture.
Even if the mixture rule is not applicable, roof acid is still a
listed hazardous waste under RCRA. Additionally, CERCLA
§ 107 grants EPA the authority to apply its reenacted mix-
ture rule retroactively. Therefore, EPA can still seek its re-
sponse action costs.
A. The Environmental Protection Agency can collect
response action costs because the mixture rule was
in effect when NURD disposed of the roof-acid
mixture.
CERCLA § 101 provides that a hazardous substance in-
cludes those substances that are listed in RCRA. Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (1980).
RCRA provides the provisions through which roof acid can be
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defined as a hazardous substance. In 1980, EPA promul-
gated a mixture rule broadening the definition of hazardous
waste to include "a mixture of solid waste and one or more
hazardous wastes listed." 40 C.F.R. 261.3 (1992). By this
definition, the roof acid disposed of by NURD, even when
mixed with the fruit juice, is a hazardous substance.
1. The Shell Oil decision to vacate the mixture rule
does not mean the mixture rule is void ab initio.
EPA may recover response costs for NURD's disposal of
the roof-acid mixture because the Shell Oil vacatur did not
establish a new principle of law. "Vacate" does not necessar-
ily equate with retroactivity, and the Shell Oil decision
should be interpreted as intending prospective application.
For this court to determine that the mixture rule was voided
ab initio, it must conclude that the Shell Oil court established
a new principle of law. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 106 (1971).
The validity of the mixture rule was first questioned in
Shell Oil. 950 F.2d at 741. EPA originally promulgated the
mixture rule as a clarification of the definition of hazardous
waste under RCRA. RCRA defined hazardous waste as a
solid waste that might "pose a substantial present or poten-
tial hazard to human health or the environment when im-
properly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). Industry
filed its first objection to the mixture rule on the day after the
rule was first promulgated, and the twelve year court battle
ended in a vacatur of the mixture rule. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at
745.
The issue to be decided by the D.C. Circuit in Shell Oil
was whether the EPA had violated the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in promul-
gating the mixture rule. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746. The
court held that the agency did not provide adequate notice of
the mixture rule. Id. at 752. The relationship between the
proposed regulation and the final rule determines the ade-
quacy of notice. Id. at 746.
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The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the mixture rule was not
an implicit or logical outgrowth of the proposed clarification
of the hazardous waste definition. Id. at 752. Although the
D.C. Circuit vacated the mixture rule, the court recognized
the pitfalls of discontinuing the regulation of hazardous
wastes. Specifically, the court remanded the mixture rule
and recommended that the EPA repromulgate it, in whole or
in part, under the "good cause" exception of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1988). Id. at 756.
NURD cannot credibly maintain that the Shell Oil
court's decision equated with a new principle of law because
the court did not announce what effect, if any, the vacatur
would have on similarly situated litigants. Likewise, NURD
cannot assume that the vacatur of the mixture rule would be
applied retroactively. The Shell Oil court did not announce a
new rule of law by vacating the mixture rule because its order
was not a "legal principle, of general application.. .expressed
in the form of a maxim or logical proposition." Lori
Caramanian, Comment, Hazardous Waste Management After
Shell Oil, 11 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 265, 286-87 (1993). The va-
catur should be seen as merely an order remanding to the
agency the mixture rule for curative actions in light of the
notice and comment infractions.
2. The discontinuity in the regulation of hazardous
wastes caused by the vacatur of the mixture rule
does not mean that the rule was void ab initio.
The Shell Oil decision did not intend to void the mixture
rule ab initio because a discontinuance in the regulation of
hazardous wastes does not equate with retroactivity. Discon-
tinuance means "ending; causing to cease; ceasing to use; giv-
ing up; or leaving off." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464
(6th ed. 1990). Equating retroactivity and void ab initio with
discontinuance violates the plain meaning of discontinuance.
In 1992, the Eighth Circuit reversed a RCRA conviction
of Albert S. Goodner, Jr. in light of the Shell Oil opinion.
United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380,
385 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 967 (1993). Good-
ner owned and operated Goodner Brothers Aircraft, Inc.
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Goodner, 966 F.2d at 382. The government prosecuted the
company and Goodner for several RCRA and CERCLA viola-
tions because of the illegal disposal of spent paint solvents.
Id.
The issue to be resolved by the Eighth Circuit was
whether the vacatur of the mixture rule by the Shell Oil court
demanded a reversal of all the defendants' RCRA and CER-
CLA convictions that were dependent upon the mixture rule.
The Eighth Circuit found that an unlawfully promulgated
regulation had no force and effect in law and was void ab ini-
tio. Id. at 384 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
313 (1979)).
The court's reasoning relied on the D.C. Circuit's plain
meaning interpretation of the word vacate. Goodner, 966
F.2d at 384. Vacate means "to annul; to cancel or rescind; to
declare, to make, or to render, void; to defeat; to deprive of
force; to make of no authority or validity; to set aside." Id.
(citing Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B., 713 F.2d 795,
797 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The Eighth Circuit assumed that this
definition of vacate required the Court to declare the mixture
rule void ab initio. See also, United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 38 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Hardin County,
1994 WL 157572, *6 (EPA) (April 12, 1994).
An analysis of the Goodner Bros., Bethlehem Steel, and
In re Hardin County decisions must start with ascertaining
what the Shell Oil court intended when it vacated and re-
manded the mixture rule to the EPA. Admittedly, the D.C.
Circuit wanted to penalize the EPA for its procedural viola-
tions of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did
have the option of leaving the mixture rule in place pending
the agency's procedural remedies. Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935
F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit may have
decided, however, that leaving the mixture rule in place
would be seen as undermining the requirements of the APA.
For that reason, the D.C. Circuit may have believed that set-
ting aside the mixture rule was a more appropriate remedy
than a simple remand for notice and comment proceedings.
The court suggested that the rule be reenacted pending the
EPA's proper procedural remedy. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752.
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Agencies may reenact rules, in whole or in part, on an interim
basis under the "good cause" exemption of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(B) pending full notice and opportunity for com-
ment. Id. (citing Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 822
F.2d 1123, 1131-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
The court did state, however, that it was concerned with
the "dangers posed by a discontinuity in the regulation of
hazardous wastes". Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752. Discontinu-
ance envisions a time line of rule enforcement, an interrup-
tion in that enforcement, and then enforcement when the
rule is reenacted. If the rule were void ab initio there would
be nothing to discontinue. Thus, the definition of discontinu-
ance does not equate with retroactivity or void ab initio.
Thus the Goodner Bros., Bethlehem Steel, and In re Hardin
County decisions reached the result that the D.C. Circuit was
attempting to avoid. It is clear from the Shell Oil court's ref-
erence to discontinuity that it did not intend to vacate the
mixture rule ab initio.
As a matter of policy, the vacatur of the mixture rule
should not be seen as void ab initio. Retroactive application
of the vacatur would allow polluters to escape liability for
their waste disposal despite the fact that they had notice of
the mixture rule. Such a congressional intent cannot be logi-
cally implied. NURD cannot now claim that it lacked notice
of the mixture rule ten years after it was promulgated. See
Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1990) ("Ignorance of the law
is no excuse."). Equity demands that NURD and other de-
spoilers of the environment pay for the response actions nec-
essary to protect human health.
B. The Environmental Protection Agency may
retroactively apply the reissued mixture rule to
recover its response action costs.
CERCLA § 107 grants EPA the authority to promulgate
rules that have a retroactive effect. The reenacted mixture
rule may be applied retroactively to hold NURD liable for its
illegal disposal of a hazardous substance. Statutory delega-
tions of legislative power to promulgate regulations having a
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retroactive effect must be conveyed by Congress in express
terms. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988). This "clear statement" principle has become the test
for regulations having retroactive effect.
In 1981, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services promulgated a regulation which limited re-
imbursements to health care providers for medicare ex-
penses. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206. The D.C. Circuit held that
the agency had violated the notice and comment procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act when the rule was chal-
lenged by local hospitals. Id.
The issue was whether the Medicare Act forbid retroac-
tive rulemaking by the Secretary to set the cost-limit rules.
Id. at 208. The Supreme Court rejected the Secretary's argu-
ments that the Medicare Act authorized retroactive rulemak-
ing. Id. at 213. The Court found no legislative intent in the
Medicare Act favoring retroactive rulemaking. Id. In fact,
the legislative history in this case tended to reveal that Con-
gress wanted to forbid retroactive cost-limit rules. Id. at 214.
In the instant case, CERCIA does not expressly provide
for retroactivity, but it is unquestioned that Congress made a
clear statement that CERCLA have retroactive effect. United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726, 733
(8th Cir. 1986). Thus, the instant case is distinguishable
from the facts in Bowen, since Congressional intent under the
Medicare Act tended to point towards disfavoring retroactiv-
ity. In the instant case congressional intent for CERCLA's
retroactive application may be found in CERCLA's legislative
history, in the statutory language of CERCLA, and in case
precedent.
The legislative history in the instant case indicates that
Congress intended that CERCLA be applied retroactively.
"With regard to retroactive responsibility for the dumping of
hazardous waste, this report would permit the Federal Gov-
ernment the option to sue the generator of hazardous waste
under a theory of strict liability to recover the cost of clean up
which had been paid for initially by Federal funds." Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., Report on Hazardous Waste Disposal 69 (Comm. Print
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1979). "Moreover, the effect of Section 604 is to impose liabil-
ity retroactively on all inactive hazardous waste sites." Haz-
ardous Waste and Toxic Waste Disposal, 1979: Hearings on
S. 1341 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution
and the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Congr., 2d
Sess. 455 (1979). "Provisions of whatever hazardous wastes
Superfund bill the Committee reports out should be made ret-
roactive to cover spills . . . ." Id. at 790.
Many courts have decided that the statutory language
and legislative history of CERCLA indicate that Congress
wanted CERCLA to have retroactive effect. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 733 (citing, among other author-
ities, United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619
F.Supp. 162, 220 (W.D. Mo. 1985). CERCLA acts remedially
and retroactively by authorizing the EPA to force responsible
parties to clean up inactive or abandoned hazardous sub-
stance sites under CERCIA § 106. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical, 810 F.2d at 733. The Eighth Circuit also found that
CERCLA's retroactivity is confirmed by legislative history.
Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
Thus, Congress conveyed in express terms that EPA promul-
gate rules having a retroactive affect. Therefore, the "clear
statement" principle found in Bowen is met.
Additionally, the EPA may reasonably interpret the
CERCLA provisions as authority to promulgate retroactive
rules as part of its gap filling responsibilities. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Con-
gress has spoken in clear terms that it expects the EPA to fill
in the statutory gaps and act retroactively in enforcing the
liability and response action provisions of CERCLA. As a
matter of policy, the EPA should be able to promulgate rules
that have retroactive effect under CERCLA. The retroactive
rules are necessary to carry out the congressional mandate
that polluters such as NURD pay for the response action
costs resulting from their illegal disposal of hazardous
substances.
10071996]
37
1008 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
C. The Environmental Protection Agency can collect
response action costs from NURD without relying on
the mixture rule.
The Environmental Protection Agency can collect re-
sponse action costs because NURD illegally disposed of roof
acid, which is a listed waste under RCRA. (R. 6). A listed
hazardous waste does not cease to be subject to RCRA and
CERCLA requirements simply by mixing it with other
wastes. United States v. Marine Shale Processors, Inc., No.
CIV. A. 90-1240, at *1, *3-4, 1994 WL 419910 (W.D.La. Aug.
1, 1994).
The EPA designated roof acid as a listed hazardous
waste on a generic, nationwide basis. As a listed hazardous
waste, roof acid remains a hazardous waste until a petition to
delist the roof acid has been approved by the EPA. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(c)(1). This "continuing jurisdiction" principle has
been the policy of the EPA for over a decade, and should not
be disregarded. James Satterfield, EPA's Mixture Rule: Why
All the Fuss?, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 10712, 10713 (1994). The
D.C. Circuit had previously acknowledged the validity of the
continuing jurisdiction policy when it held that the "con-
tained-in" policy remains as "one application of a general
principle, consistently adhered to, that a hazardous waste
does not lose its hazardous character simply because it
changes form or is combined with other substances." Chemi-
cal Waste Management, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 869 F.2d 1526, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
As a matter of policy, the Environmental Protection
Agency should be allowed to collect its response action costs
from NURD because the mixture rule was merely a clarifica-
tion of the regulation of hazardous wastes under the continu-
ing jurisdiction principle of 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(1). NURD
cannot escape liability for its disposal of roof acid, a listed
waste under RCRA and a hazardous substance under
CERCLA.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Environmental Protection
Agency respectfully requests this court uphold the District
Court's decision that Congress was within its Commerce
Clause authority in enacting RCRA, and that a private cause
of action for restitution is not created in Section 7002. Fur-
thermore, this court should reverse the District Court's deci-
sion that NURD is not liable under CERCLA § 107.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Appellant and Amicus
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